The+Narrative+Theory+of+the+Self

The "self" is thought to be a unifying substance independent of, but interrelated to the properties of the mind. However, some theories of the self argue that this independent substance that we call the self is a useful illusion or fiction. One such theory, by Daniel Dennett, is called the "Narrative Theory".

The Narrative Theory of the Self
Daniel Dennett suggests that the most helpful way to describe what the "self" consists of is to consider it as an abstract, psychologically constructed //idea//, rather than something tangible which can be pointed to. He compares the idea of the "self" to the abstract idea of a center of gravity, which is simply a helpful term to refer to something quite real, but quite intangible. "The physicist does an //interpretation//, if you like, of the chair and its behavior, and comes up with the theoretical abstraction of a center of gravity, which is then very useful in characterizing the behavior of the chair in the future, under a wide variety of conditions" (AM 238). Dennett suggests that the same is true for the abstraction of the self.

This is a widely accepted view in psychological theory and has much supporting evidence in research. It is particularly seen within what is called autobiographical memory and consistency theory.

Gilbert the Novel-Writing Machine
Dennett does note that a notion of the self is much more complex than that of a center of gravity, and seeking to make this clearer, he introduces the idea of the Narrative Self, by way of thought experiment, namely of the novel-writing machine. Supposing that this machine has been given "a great stock of whatever information it might need, and some partially random and hence unpredictable ways of starting the seed of a story going, and building upon it" (AM 240), and has not been programmed to write any novel in particular, we can imagine that it begins to write its novel. "'Call me Gilbert,' it says. ... Now Gilbert is a fictional, created self but its creator is no self. ... Gilbert is a product of a design or invention process in which there aren't any selves at all. That is, I am //stipulating// that this is not a conscious machine, not a 'thinker.' It is a dumb machine, but it does have the power to write a passable novel" (240).

Dennett continues on to explain that even if the robot were given mobility and began to write about its experiences in the world (for example, if I were to hit the robot with a baseball bat, it would subsequently write about Gilbert's experience of getting hit with a baseball bat by a character very similar to me), that is not to suggest that the robot itself knows anything about the world, and is therefore not a "self." "It doesn't even know that it's creating a fictional character. (The same is just as true of your brain; //it// doesn't know what it's doing either.)" Nevertheless, we understand the robot to be constructing a type of biography (an autobiography?), which tells a narrative of a self which can then be interpreted by us. However, the robot is //also// an interpreter, and Dennett suggests that the same is true for us. It can be helpful to equate your body/brain with the dumb (i.e. unconscious) robot, and your "self" may be equated with "Gilbert," as his narrative is written by the robot. '

=Issues with Gilbert=

Upon examining the Gilbert example, I have found a few uncomfortable thoughts within myself concerning him. How are we to say that a computer has a self, simply because he can create? He was created by people! But then again so was I. So what is different? Other people put information into him in order for him to write, but then again others seems to inform me, facts or opinions I then stretch and compress and destroy until I can use them further, or leave them by the wayside. Ah! the computer cannot do this. Merely because he has creativity or because he can produce forth information in varying forms he is 'aware' of doesn't mean he has a self. Personality seems to denote one as being capable of denoting self. It seems that personality allows us to stretch and destroy information, making new and unheard of information. Creating opinions seems to be a trait of self, as it allows us to be distinguished from another self.



Edit: I am not even sure that the word “create” should be associated with Gilbert. As mentioned above, Gilbert uses some “random and hence unpredictable ways of starting the seed of a story” (AM 240). In other words, Gilbert is simply assembling the information given to him in some random order. It seems that Gilbert is no different than the fictional room full of monkeys in a room full of typewriters who eventually “write” a Shakespeare play. Did these monkeys actually create a Shakespeare play? – absolutely not. It was simply a random stroke of luck. Likewise, any understandable writings by Gilbert would seem to be random at best. This random assembly of information cannot substitute for self. As mentioned in the paragraph above, when given information, I can manipulate this information until I find some proper use for it. In others words, I think…Gilbert does not.

In this sense then could it be concluded that selfhood denotes the ability to impose meaning? A self would have specific ideas of how things should be, beyond of how things really are- something Gilbert lacks- not being programed with values. This idea aligns with the proposition that the self forms opinions, specifically beyond what its given to it through various sources of others, experience and facts. However this selfhood is then completely dependent on a human meaning- and held to a purely human psychological standard. I see this argument as simply finding flaw in the example of Gilbert- but not in Dennet's argument that the self is a psychologically constructed phenomenon.

=**Galen Strawson**=

**Two Theses, Four Positions:**
//**Theses**:// > > //**Positions**://
 * 1) Psychological Narrativity Thesis: “Empirical Thesis about the way humans experience their lives – this is how we are, its say, this is our nature.”
 * 2) Ethical Narrativity Thesis: A richly narrative outlook on one’s life is essential to living well, to true or full personhood.
 * 1) 1st thesis is correct, the 2nd is false. “One may think that we are indeed deeply Narrative in our thinking and that it’s not a good thing.”
 * 2) 1st thesis is false, the 2nd is correct. “One may grant that we’re not all naturally Narrative in our thinking while holding that we should be.”
 * 3) Both the 1st and 2nd theses are true. “All normal human beings are naturally narrative and Narrativity is crucial to a good life.”
 * 4) Both the 1st and 2nd theses are false (Strawson’s stance). “There are deeply non-narrative people and there are good ways to live that are deeply non-narrative.”

A Response: Strawson’s two theses, and resulting four positions regarding these theses offer a nice summary of various views about the self. My problem with Strawson and Dennett (and others) is their attempt to prove or demonstrate that their position is the correct position. Strawson points out that the belief that both theses are true “is the dominant view in the academy” (AM 249). Strawson goes on to say, “one may think both theses are false; this is my view” (AM 249). Why does one position regarding these theses have to necessarily be the “right” opinion. It’s possible, and actually probable, that each of the positions on the two theses has an element of truth. I am sure that there are examples of people from each of the four positions that would indicate that they have a fulfilling life. People are not all the same – what is enriching to one is torment to the other. Perhaps it is time to stop searching for the one “right” answer and realize that there is no one “right” answer to the self.

=**Episodic Argument**:= To be Episodic is to notice that the self, in the present, is not the same as the self that was in the past. Instead of following a narrative, an episodic sees life divided by sections of episodes. For instance, the person I am now is not the same as the person that I was at the age of 12. “At the same time I have no sense that I was there in the past, and think it obvious that I was not there, as a matter of metaphysical fact.” I am operating the same body, have the same memories, but I am not the same self. The memories of that former self can only create an experience, it can never return the present to the past self.

Self is Eternally Realized

=Argument against Episodic Argument= To say that you are not the same person at another age would mean that you are not the same person after every action. I don't see how someone could put intervals in this. You could say after every action you are a different "person". This takes all responsibility from you. Although you realize the self is present, that does mean that when you were twelve the self was still present. So that self at that time is the same one. It may have changed, but the overall self is still the same one. The last statement of making your present self into your past self is correct. That is impossible, that is only impossible because that self is the same one. The present self still holds the qualities of the past self.