Heterophenomenology+and+the+Study+of+Consciousness

=Daniel Dennett - Heterophenomenology= In his //Consciousness Explained//, Daniel Dennett advocated a method for studying consciousness he termed "heterophenomenology" or a "third-person methodology" (AM, 81) to understanding and researching human consciousness. The basis of this method was Dennett's skepticism regarding the reliability of first-person ascriptions of conscious experience. As he wrote:

//"You are// not //authoritative about what is happening to you, but only about what// seems //to be happening to you, and we are giving you total, dictorial authority over the accoun////t of how it seems to you, about// what it is like to be you//."// (AM, 84)

Heterophenomenology takes the study of consciousness to rely fundamentally on the data of **what subjects believe themselves to be experiencing** rather than the conscious experiences themselves. According to Dennett, this is completely scientifically sound because the best way to know what a person is consciously experiencing is to study his beliefs about what he is experiencing. According to Dennett, there are four data forms that comprise a person's conscious experience and his introspection about said experiences:

(a) 'conscious experiences themselves' (b) beliefs about these experiences (c) 'verbal judgments' expressing these beliefs (d) utterances of one sort or another (AM, 83)

Dennett says that the objective of heterophenomenologists is to take (b), and use those beliefs as the primary data for their experiments. He warns against the notion that scientists ought only to study (a), for two reasons: first of all, if there is something beyond what the subjects believe they are experiencing, then it is inaccessible to them and thus even more inaccessible to scientists; furthermore, if the subject believes he experiences something beyond what he actually experiences, then it is only relevant to study why the subject believes he is experiencing these things rather than to study the irrelevant "non-existent experiences" (AM, 83). Dennett also proposes that one must have a third-person view to accept any studies about consciousness. He disapproves of so-called autophenomenology, in which scientists or philosophers study their own conscious experiences and analyze them as data. The third-person view is necessary in order to evaluate the data scientifically.

=Methodology of Heterophenomenology:=

“Experiments in which Human subjects collaborate with experiments (making suggestions, interacting verbally, telling what it is like)” In these experiments the experimenter's job is to analyze the data procured (the introspections) from a completely neutral stance. This allows room for investigation to determine how the beliefs relate to reality. The results can then be taken into further consideration in a larger context, using other forms of relevant information, like fMRI data, to compile theories. This is in fact the predominant methodology at work in Psychology today and Dennett holds this out as the way to conduct experiments on the subjective, if done properly.

However, if Dennett wants to achieve reliable results, then the basic data must be reliable as well. He has pointed out that the subject is “not authoritative about what is happening to you…” (AM 84), yet is willing to give the subject “total, dictatorial authority over the account of how it seems to [the subject]” (AM 84). Dennett goes on to say that for “heterophenomenologists, the primary data are the utterances, the raw, uninterpreted data” of the subject (AM 83). From this data, the researcher to understand the subject’s beliefs, and eventually to the conscious experiences of the subject. But, the utterances of the subject are influenced, if not controlled by the beliefs of the subject. And, as Descartes points out in //Meditations on First Philosophy//, he has __believed__ many falsehoods in his life. So, the subject’s beliefs, which influence the utterances that Dennett wants to use as “primary data,” could in fact be tainted. Hence, Dennett’s method has achieved nothing that is necessarily scientifically reliable.

Arguments for Heterophenomenology
The basis of Dennett's method is that our own introspections about our own consciousness are hopelessly unreliable. Thus, those studying consciousness must, "reserve judgment" about whether the reports of what a subject believes they experience are true and reliable. This provides a "third-person" perspective on the study of consciousness, focussing on the "he-she-they" of a report rather than empathizing with the subject in a way that entails a first person "I" approach.

A practical application of heterophenomenology would be Nagel's concept of subjective universals. Subjective universals are examples of subjective conscious experiences that can be understood objectively. By collecting a general consensus or "universal" cognitive subjectivity has the potential to be understood objectively. Thus, Dennett's concept of heterophenomenology has the ability to understand consciousness empirically.

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vs.

Map-scanning experiment:

//Test//: Subjects were required to study this map, form a mental image of it, and then told to focus on different objects (e.g. the lake, the well, the tree) in it. //Results//: The further away the object was from the prior location attended to, the longer it took to focus on the new object. For instance, if the prior location was the lake, it took longer to focus on the well than the tree.

==== Stephen Kosslyn argued from this experiment that YOU USED THE MENTAL IMAGE. The time it took subjects to report their answers is equivalent to the time it takes to physically travel between the objects that he questions were about. This shows, argued Kosslyn, that the subject's reports of using mental images is correct. ====

Zenon Pylyshyn disagreed. The time it takes you to answer these questions also correlates with the time that you unconsciously know it takes for you to scan the image.

This supports heterophenomenology because it suggests that the way to investigate one's consciousness is to take their belief reports to BE TRUE OF WHAT THE SUBJECT TAKES TO BE TRUE, rather than what is really true.

Arguments Against Heterophenomenology


[| D. W. Smith] claims in the "Three Facets of Consciousness" that, "If we are to understand the mind, we must understand more clearly the philosophical disciplines of phenomenology and ontology" (94). In this claim he is saying that the mind cannot be conceptualized properly with science or historical-contextual approaches. Instead we must begin to understand the nature of consciousness through examination of its substrate, form, and appearance. All entities are composed of or represent these three things; so must consciousness.

Smith stresses the importance of acknowledging the correlation between phenomenology (the study of consciousness) and //ontology//: "...When we want to see the //unity// of the world, we must inform natural science with fundamental ontology. ...And when we turn to the nature of mind itself, the empirical analysis of our own consciousness is pursued expressly and methodically by phenomenology. Moreover, it is ontology that must define the //type// of relation that holds between mind and its grounding in brain activity. This is a matter of formal ontology, rather than of empirical investigation //per se//..." (98). In other words, one of Smith's aims is to show how the //assumption// of the existence of an entity "consciousness" (something you and I assumed before we ever became involved in the philosophical discussion of consciousness, hard problems and all) is a way to begin proving its necessity. The ontological assumption, then, is a way to define the actual experience of consciousness.

Since we are concerned with an ontological question, Smith divides the problem of consciousness into three "facets" (as mentioned above).

=**The Three Facets of Consciousness**=

"An act of consciousness - my experience of thinking, seeing, or doing such-and-such - is an entity with three facets: --D.W. Smith (102)
 * 1) Its form is its structure of intentionality, its being directed from subject toward object through a content or meaning, with inner awareness of itself (*apperception*).
 * 2) Its appearance is how I experience it, "what it is like" for me to live or perform this act of consciousness.
 * 3) Its substrate is its origin or background in conditions including brain activity, psychological motivation, cultural ideas or practices, and the biological evolution of this form of mind..."

**In Support Of The Three Facets Of Consciousness:**
D.W. Smith’s position on the study of consciousness seems to be more inclusive than other theories. Smith is not advocating that scientific methods be done away with altogether. Rather, he suggests that empirical sciences can be “informed by further disciplines that are not ‘empirical,’ or ‘naturalistic,’ or. . . ‘humanistic’ (AM 94). In defining the three facets of consciousness, Smith seems to acknowledge that consciousness is much more involved than as viewed through the narrow scientific eyes of Dennett. In describing the various factors that comprise the substrate of consciousness, for example, Smith demonstrates that the study of consciousness is indeed a complex one. Smith’s broader viewpoint on the study of consciousness seems to have potential for success.

**Smith on Naturalism:**
"The 'loftier forms' of naturalism are what attract the philosopher. I believe in the unity of knowledge. I believe moreover in the unity of the world: one world in which physical, mental, and cultural phenomena take their interweaving places. And I believe that every mental process has a physical grounding and is consistent with the natural sciences. (In fact, I am quite partial to the metaphor of "ground" in ontology, as we shall see.) So far, naturalism: both methodological and ontological (these need to be distinguished)." -D.W. Smith, pg. 97

Smith seems to be pointing out that he sees the world through the lens of naturalism. What exactly is naturalism first? Dictionary.com (i know, lame) states that naturalism is "the belief that all phenomena are covered by laws of science and that all teleological explanations are therefore without value." . He is also pointing out that he sees the world, both conscious and physical, connected in all things. That knowledge consciously and physically can be deduced in the same way. The only issue is our lack of probing this knowledge correctly and effectively. The process simply does not exist. He sees it in combining phenomenology and ontology, yet what if he is wrong? What if probing this method of thinking deeper is a lost cause. Or what if consciousness is subjective, and can really only be understood for each person (depending on their dedication to probing their own consciousness). But then even there, how are we to go about that?

It seems that even though we have come a long way in putting out various hypotheses of what consciousness exists as, what its nature is like, etc. we shouldn't be able to truly figure it out until enough people have exhausted the study of combining phenomenology and ontology. From this we will either discover the secrets of the mind and consciousness, find only yet another problem, or discover we cannot know anything about it at all.

[|Meaning of Ontology]