Animal+Cognition

=**Animal Cognition **=

__**Bennet's Economy Rule & Morgan's Cannon**__

When it comes to animal cognition, there are a myriad of theories revolving around every phenomenon. Because of the unnecessary complexity of some theories, Jonathan Bennett and C. Lloyd Morgan have implemented their own versions of Occam's Razor – that is, to go with the simplest possible explanation. In long form, as written by C. Lloyd Morgan: "In no case may we interpret an action as the outcome of the exercise of a higher psychical faculty, if it can be interpreted as the outcome of the exercise of one which stands lower in the psychological scale" (Arguing About the Mind, 390-391)

In one of his articles, Bennett provides an example of this process. Take Sylvia, the cat. When she is hungry and hears food dropping into her bowl, she takes it as a signal for her to come and eat. Using the same sort of argument that Pavlov uses in his classical conditioning experiments with the saliva of dogs, we see that due to the sound of either a can opener or the pouring of food into the bowl it makes the can aware of the presence of food, and that she can eat it. Bennet would argue that the cat itself is not recognizing a mental urge that she is hungry and that she should eat but a conditioned process of actions. Once the repetitive sound of either a can opener or pouring of food is heard, the conditioned response is to run to the food and eat.

The other example that we can assess from the argument that Bennet makes against the non-simplistic thinking of animals is what it means for an animal to love. As argued in class affection (attractiveness) and love can be two different concepts. An animal might assess what is attractive in a male of female of his or her species as a concept of what humans call love, however, the mere concept of love and the human definition of it can never be reached between animals be cause they are simple minded and cannot know what love is. Animal sex, is an example of prolonging the existence of their species. when selecting a partner for reproduction they might look for youthfulness or strength but not out of love or attraction but out of what is best for the existence of their genes, to make better offsprings.

**__ John Dupre’s Two Themes About Mental States of Animals __**

John Dupre

First, Dupre believes that Cartesian assumptions have had a powerful and harmful influence on what we think about the mental states of animals. Per Dupre, Descartes has given us a much too homogeneous view of the mental. The nature of thought, per Descartes, is experienced by the agent experiencing it.

Second, Dupre believes that there is more than just one fundamental question as to whether animals really think. Dupre suggests that we often presuppose that there is one essential element of thought and so we ask, “do animals possess this element?” This line of reasoning is very Cartesian as well, so actually, Dupre’s two themes are closely related to one another.

If we follow Cartesian reasoning, we can never have access to this essential element in the case of another mind. We cannot in fact that this element even exists, except in our own minds. The natural following question is whether or not we can even believe in the existence of minds other than our own.

This problem has traditionally been overcome by argument from analogy. We observe that certain mental states correlate to with characteristic modes of behavior. We observe in other people the same patterns of behavior and infer that they are accompanied by the same mental states that we have.

Dupre’s problem with this line of thinking is that these types of arguments are inadequate. He points out that “an inductive argument based on observation of one case to a generalization over a population of billions is hardly deserving of the title ‘argument’.” (AM 409).

**__ Dupre’s Position __**

Dupre thinks that much can be taken from analytic behaviorism “when it is separated from the claim that mental terms can be analytically reduced to sets of behaviors” (AM 410). Dupre says that there is a conceptual connection between thought and behavior, but not a logical connection as the behaviorists would believe.

Dupre says that we need to think of what is involved in explaining the meanings of mental terms and behavior certainly is an important part of that explanation. For example, Dupre says that by observing ourselves and others in various painful positions and expressions of pain, we can learn the meaning of pain. We can than apply that meaning of other cases. The difference between this position and the position of behaviorists’ is that for the behaviorist, ‘pain’ describes pain behavior, but Dupre’s position says that the expressions of pain become actual criteria of pain. Dupre does point out that such criteria can sometimes be disingenuous.

Using this position, we can now consider other minds, both human and non-human. For instance, since we are now familiar with the criteria of pain, when we see someone, or something, else exhibit these expressions of pain, we can conclude that we are seeing a clear instance of pain. Dupre takes the opportunity to criticize Cartesian thought here – if something such as pain is just an internal state, “no criterion could be communicated for the application of the term, since only the person attempting to explain the term has any access to the private feature that is supposed to serve as a criterion; and hence no distinction could be imparted between correct and incorrect application of a term” (AM 411). Contrary to this thought, Dupre says that we know pain when we see pain, and likewise, we know intelligence when we see intelligent actions – whether in other humans or in animals.

Dupre says that there is no deep, one question involved in consciousness. There is no one essence that we are looking for to determine animal intelligence - we know it when we see it

**__ Easy Questions About Animal Minds __**

Are animals conscious? Or, put another way, are animals aware of what they are doing? Using Dupre’s arguments from above, we can conclude that if there are criteria distinguishing conscious from non-conscious states, and we witness an animal displaying behavior that we recognize as fulfilling the criteria of consciousness, then we can conclude that the animal is aware of what it is doing. Dupre uses the example of his cat stalking a bird. He can observe the cat’s body quivering with intensity, concentrating on its prey. Obviously, this cat is aware of what it is doing.

Are animals aware of things that are not immediately present to them? To show that his cat is not merely an unthinking robot, Dupre relates how his cat, upon hearing a certain noise, knows that he is about to be fed and runs to the kitchen to be fed; the cat is aware that food is about to be available, even though it is not yet present. However, if the cats are not hungry, they may not respond at all. Dupre says, “it strikes me that the assumption that they associate certain sounds with (absent) food, and hence, if they are hungry, go to the kitchen where food is often provided for them, is vastly more parsimonious than any attempt to reduce the phenomena to conditioned pairs of stimuli and responses” (AM 414-415).

Are animals intelligent? Dupre refers to Gilbert Ryle who argues that intelligence is grounded primarily in intelligent action. Once again, Dupre refers back to his basic premise – we know when we see an intelligent action – or, in other words, “intelligent performances are criteria of intelligence” (AM 415). Dupre points out that animals have shown success in many problem-solving scenarios. Based on the behaviors we see from animals, we can conclude that many animals are indeed intelligent.

There are those who would argue that intelligence would require language skills. Dupre disagrees. He points out, “if, as I have suggested, intelligence should be conceived as appropriate and flexible response to problem-posing situations, then it is impossible to see why this should require linguistic ability” (AM 417). Dupre says that possession of concepts is all that is required for intelligence – not the ability to connect these concepts with linguistic ability.

 __**A New Study on the Cognitive Rift**__  A Harvard scientist, Marc Hauser, recently conducted a test that shed some new light on the apparent cognitive differences betwixt chimpanzees and humans:

<span style="display: block; font-family: Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif; font-size: 13px; font-weight: normal; line-height: 15px; margin: 0px; padding: 5px 0px; text-align: justify;"> Recently, scientists have found that some animals think in ways that were once considered unique to humans: For example, some animals have episodic memory, or non-linguistic mathematical ability, or the capacity to navigate using landmarks. However, despite these apparent similarities, a cognitive gulf remains between humans and animals. <span style="display: block; font-size: 10pt; line-height: 115%; margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify;"> Hauser presents four distinguishing ingredients of human cognition, and shows how these capacities make human thought unique. These four novel components of human thought are the ability to combine and recombine different types of information and knowledge in order to gain new understanding; to apply the same "rule" or solution to one problem to a different and new situation; to create and easily understand symbolic representations of computation and sensory input; and to detach modes of thought from raw sensory and perceptual input. <span style="display: block; font-size: 10pt; line-height: 115%; margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify;"> Source: <span style="font-family: Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif; line-height: 15px;">Harvard University (2008, February 22). What Is The Cognitive Rift Between Humans And Other Animals?. //ScienceDaily//. Retrieved December 15, 2010, from http://www.sciencedaily.com­/releases/2008/02/080217102137.htm

**__ Hard Questions About Animal Minds __**

<span style="display: block; font-size: 10pt; line-height: 115%; margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify;">Dupre quotes Wittgenstein in asking the questions, “If a lion could talk, we would not understand it” (AM 420). Animals obviously lead different lives than humans and their hypothetical language makes no sense to us. Is it therefore, a mistake to apply terms of our language to another animal? For example, are we wrong in applying the term pain to an lion? Although there are expressions of pain that may be similar to lions and humans, there are differences as well. Lions do not necessarily cry, and lions to not utter verbal statements such as, “that hurts.” Perhaps the concept of pain does not really cross over to the animal world.

<span style="display: block; font-size: 10pt; line-height: 115%; margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify;">However, language should not be a part of this discussion. Dupre says that humans do not “come to feel pains at the point when they learn to talk about them; on the contrary, they show that if pain did not pre-exist language, there could not be such language” (AM 420).

<span style="display: block; font-size: 10pt; line-height: 115%; margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify;">Dupre says that we should focus not on trying to understand the lion (or other animal) but rather to focus on what //we// mean by attributing pain to a lion. He points out that the word //pain// is our word, in our language. We should note that lions and other animals avoid things that cause them pain, and they withdraw rapidly from painful stimuli. Generally, animals’ responses to pain are similar to human responses. Hence, we can conclude that whatever it is called, “pain” experiences are uncomfortable to animals just as they are in humans.

<span style="display: block; font-size: 10pt; line-height: 115%; margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify;">Dupre touches on the ethical questions that this argument brings up and concludes that we should avoid causing animals any of these experiences that we call painful.

<span style="display: block; font-size: 10pt; line-height: 115%; margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify;">Ultimately the hard problems concerning animal minds lie in the answer to these questions. What are their perceptual capacities? What features of the environment are they capable of discriminating? What goals do animals pursue? What level of intelligence can they bring in pursuing these goals?

<span style="display: block; font-size: 10pt; line-height: 115%; margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify;">These are some of the hard questions about animal minds.

<span style="display: block; font-size: 10pt; line-height: 115%; margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify;">To this point, all has been posted by Colby Esposito, Jordan Logan, Mac Gostow, and Chad Wimberly. Jordan Logan posted as "Guest." All others had the wherewithal to post as themselves.