Eliminating+the+Self

It would be absurd to have a theory of "Ether" or a theory of "Phlogiston". Why? Because neither Ether nor Phlogiston really exist. Similarly, many philosophers and psychologists have arrived at the conclusion that a theory of the "Self" is equally absurd. Why? Because the Self does not really exist. This point is stronger than merely claiming that the self is disunified or a mere fiction. The point is that talk of the self should be eliminated in the same way that talk of an ether or phlogiston was eliminated.

Arguments for Elimination of the Self


I wish to argue //against// Olson's argument that the self is not an issue, but an ambiguous non-existent figment of human thought. Perhaps the self is some sort of connection, a link between mind and body. Why? Simple: supposing that A's mind is transferred to B's body (a person of a different gender), then they will not be of the same self. Same mind, but different body creates a different self. This could very well be a different part, so long as one is content to define the self as the minds conception not only of its own existence and cognition, but also linked with its known interactions with the physical through it's body. Now the mind will never transferred to another, at least not in the near future, so it is safe to say that the mind is able to continue on in the same essence of this definition. Surely, age will deteriorate its ability to recognize certain things about not only itself, but the body to which it belongs, however it is not too farfetched to say that its essence of thought process (not its recollection of events) stays the same. This is true for the perception of thoughts as well. Doubtless it will forget memories, but the perception will persist on with the memories it holds onto. And even if things are //forgotten// they will still affect the mind's process of existence. So, in conclusion, it seems that the self can be defined as something that is the sum of the mind and body, a commonplace within the distinctions.

Solution to the "Problem" of Individuation
1) Things are individuated numerically. 2) Numerical things are spacial. 3) Minds are relationally attached to the body. 4) Minds are individuated by relation to the body. 5) Minds //have// identity.

= **Personal Regards to Eric T. Olsen:** = The argument present through your paper, //There is No Problem of the Self//, is a cheap attempt to disavow the existence of the self. A rejection of the accounts of "self", and claiming that the disagreement voids the positions can only be described as utter stupidity. But to show you your error I will go along with your attempt at correction. If all of these accounts of the self are incorrect, then please give an answer that deserves the title of the “self”. It needs to be a definition that is not ambiguous and envelops the many accounts of the self. “What we need is not just an account of the self that would command wider assent that any of these, but one that would synthesize them and show them all to reflect a part of some larger, common idea.” Unfortunately, instead of giving the anticipated answer you quit. “But we can say no more about this possibility until someone produces a candidate for that role.” Nothing will be produced if arguments are not put forth and subject to review, quitting is not an option!

ANIMALS CAN COMMUNICATE EXPERIENCE THROUGH WORDS!

=**Olson’s Divide of the Self:**= Olson approaches the sections of thought (Personal identity/ Semantics/ Philosophy of Mind/ Moral Psychology/ Cognitive Psychology/Epistemology), which deal with the self, and show that none of them actually are about the self. His claim is that though these areas all deal with something that is remotely similar that none of them actually have a common idea of the self. Thus they should not define a definition of the self.