Animal+Social+Cognition

Daniel Povinelli



According to Gallup, "Animals that pass the mirror test are self-aware and thus can infer the states of mind of another individual." (424) Although Povinelli would agree that chimpanzees have a self-concept, he would disagree that self-awareness necessarily follows. When taking the mirror test, an individual with a self-concept would conclude, "That's the same as me," (436) whereas an individual with self-awareness would correctly conclude, "That //is// me!" (436). Even though Povinelli agrees that chimpanzees have a self-concept, it is self-awareness that gives humans the ability to empathize.

The inability to know the source of sight is not the same as the inability to attribute mental states. In other words although the chimps may be unable to tell which researcher can see them when one is blindfolded and the other wears a blindfold across the mouth, this can also be explained by the possibility that the chimp simply does not know how people see. The chimp may, for example believe that humans see with their noses. This is not without precedent, since even humans have displayed confusion regarding the function of major organ systems, such as ancient people who believed that thinking occurred in the heart.

Human Self Recognition Video media type="youtube" key="cTP01Wbsh0E?fs=1" height="385" width="480"

Great Ape Self Recognition Video

media type="youtube" key="vJFo3trMuD8?fs=1" height="385" width="480"

Criticism

Gordon G. Gallup Jr.



Gallup argues that because chimpanzees and orangutans recognize themselves in a mirror, they are able to formulate a self-concept. This self-concept effectively results in self-awareness, and the ability to attribute mental states to other beings. Povinelli's claim is less plausible; self-concept and self-awareness are functionally indentical, except where mistakes in self-concept or self-awareness arise. (The 2 year old argument, found on pages 435-436, demonstrates this premise) While the mistake in self-concept that Povinelli notes is novel ("It's Jennifer... but why is she wearing my shirt."), mistakes in self-awareness also occur and are also novel (alien hand syndrome). As a result, Gallup's account, which considers self-concept and self-awareness to be functioinally the same, is the better argument.

Gallup does not explain why a self-concept necessarily leads to self-awareness and the ability to attribute mental states to others. This connection is unclear and Gallup makes this leap without any empirical data. He only states that "Knowledge of self paves the way for an inferential knowledge of others." Although this may be true, it does not follow logically. A simple example is the case of individuals diagnosed with autism. Autistic individuals have a clear sense of self-concept, but seem to be unable to recognize and empathize with mental states of other individuals (Robert M. Gordon and John A. Barker in the Autism and the "Theory of Mind Debate"). All that Gallup is witnessing is observational learning.

=Links to other sources:= colinallen.dnsalias.org/TheCognitiveAnimal/P1/gallupp1.pdf www.wjh.harvard.edu/~mnkylab/publications/.../replyAnderson.pdf [] []