Delusion

=**Delusion**=

A //delusion// is typically understood to be a pathological belief, held in spite of evidence to the contrary (oftentimes overwhelmingly so). The criteria for determining whether a belief is delusional is widely contested. Indeed, some even deny that a delusion is a type of belief at all; G. Lynn Stephens and George Graham suggest four criteria for determining whether something is a delusion or a belief, expanded below.

**Capgras' Delusion**
Capgras' Delusion refers to a rare type of delusion in which the patient believes that someone they are close to (e.g. a spouse, a sibling, a friend, etc.) is actually an imposter.

media type="youtube" key="dqBGzkz1oDU?fs=1" height="385" width="480" ==

V.S. Ramachandran: "The Unbearable Likeness of Being"
In the above video, David, like Arthur--the patient mentioned in Ramachandran's article "The Unbearable Likeness of Being"--suffers from Capgras' Syndrome. According to Ramachandran's theory, Capgras patients have a disconnect between the visual cortex, which processes visual information, and the amygdala, which registers emotions in the brain. This prevents them from feeling the appropriate emotional response when seeing their loved ones, which causes them to think their family members and close friends are impostors. This theory gives a solid neuroscientific explanation for the oddities observed in Capras patients. Ramachandran uses this theory to show that neuroscience can provide satisfactory explanations for psychological phenomena.

Objection to Ramachandran's Argument
One possible objection to the amygdala disconnect explanation of Capgras delusions is that many people are born without a properly functioning amygdalas or lose their amygdalas entirely, and yet none of them develop Capgras' Syndrome. Ramachandran's response to that argument is to say that "all our perceptions--indeed, maybe all aspects of our minds--are governed by comparisons and not absolute values" (AM, 292). The reason why Capgras patients behave the way they do is because they have their prior experiences as a comparison point. They know that they are supposed to feel a certain emotion when they see their mother or father or spouse, but because of the disconnect in their brains, they do not feel this emotion. Because of this inconsistency with what they expected to happen, they consider their close loved one to be an impostor. People who are born with an amygdala malfunction have no prior experience with emotional responses to their parents or loved ones, and people who lose all amygdala function in an accident have no other normal emotional functions with which to compare. People with Capgras' delusion still function normally in other emotional aspects; it is only the link from the visual cortex to the amygdala that has been compromised.

It is because of the Capgras syndrome and the subsequent explanation of it that leads Ramachandran to believe that human perceptions are not absolute but rather based on a complex system of comparisons. When this system is disturbed, delusions such as Capgras result.

= **Stephens and Graham’s Argument:** =

G. Lynn Stephens and George Graham state their strategy thus:

//"...to refine 'delusion' so as to classify non-belief-like cases as well as belief-like cases as delusions. Our aim is to provide a unified account of delusions that embraces both belief and non-belief cases. ...We shall propose an alternative definition or summary prototype of delusion, according to which, being deluded that p (where 'p' represents the topical or thematic content of the delusion) is a matter of adopting a special complex, higher order attitude towards the lower order thought or content of p."// (AM 300)

The basis for the discrepancy between higher and lower order attitudes consists within the //pathological character// of the delusion, which is found in how the patient cognitively holds his or her delusion, rather than in the belief/delusion itself. Thus, we must look at the delusional stance of the patient (i.e. the higher order attitude, directed at the lower order content) in order to determine whether the thing which the patient holds to is a belief or a delusion.

Essentially, Stephens and Graham argue this way:

1. Delusions and beliefs are not the same. 2. Beliefs must reach four criteria (Content/ Confidence/ Reason and Action/ Affect). 3. Delusions do not meet these criteria. 4. Thus delusions and beliefs are not the same.

=**The Criteria:**= ==== Stephens and Graham argue that delusions are not incorrect or warped belief, but that delusions are not belief at all. They propose four criteria that all beliefs fulfill (at the same time) while, on the other hand, delusions do not fulfill all four – they may fulfill one or two, but rarely do they fulfill all four. The four criteria are as follows: ====
 * 1) ==== **Content Claim**: beliefs possess representational content, for instance, they represent the world or self as being or possible being a certain way.” In this claim, beliefs must have a substance to them. For example, if someone asked you why you believe there is no God, you would be able to answer something along the lines that evolution provides all the answers when necessary. Your belief would have content, in that there is an explanation and expansion of what you believe. ====
 * 2) ==== **Confidence Claim**: “believers are confident or convinced that the representational content of the belief is true.” This claim is simple enough – you have to genuinely believe what you believe is true and not merely be making statements. ====
 * 3) ==== **Reason and Action Claim**: “believers take account of the truth of the content or proposition in reasoning and action; beliefs guide the believer’s decisions about what she might or ought to think or do.” When someone believes something, that will affect their actions. You are able to trace back a reason behind their different actions. For example, someone who believes that stepping on a sidewalk crack will indeed break their mother’s back will avoid stepping on cracks at all costs (assuming, of course, that they also have a good relationship with their mother). ====
 * 4) ==== **Affect Claim**: “beliefs tend to call up suitable affective responses or emotions, given one’s values and desires.” This is also self explanatory. If you believe in something, it should resonate with you to some degree. Deluded people who, for example, believe that their parents aren’t really their parents – but instead are identical imposters – feel no fear, despite the fact that they ‘believe’ their parents are missing. ====