Criticisms+of+the+Hard+Problem+of+Consciousness

=Criticisms of the Hard Problem =



Francis Crick & Christof Koch

In Why Neuroscience May Be Able to Explain Consciousness, Francis Crick (co-discoverer of the double helix structure of DNA) and neuroscientist Christof Koch (Cal Tech) argue that Chalmer's hard problem is actually several more Hard Problems, and can be divided into specific questions that are amiable to solvable through empirical experiment such as: thought. Some questions they propose are: "What particular neural activation leads to a particular conscience experience?" or experience?", and "Why are some aspects of subjective experience impossible to convey to other people?" Empirical work is able to describe the relationship between neural activation and experience. Crick and Koch are essentially separating the Hard Problem in to several easy problems that will hopefully help us eventually solve the Hard Problem.

The Halle Berry Neuron and NCC
One particularly interesting example of Koch's work is his discovery of single cells that are ONLY and ALWAYS activated during particular conscious experiences.

As this graph indicates, the particular cell being read only responds to images that bring about conscious experiences of the actress Halle Berry. Furthermore, no other image provides high levels of activation of this particular cell.

This experiment provides a neat example of a "neural correlate of consciousness" (or NCCs). NCCs, however, do not suggest in and of themselves that the hard problem is an illusion, only that there are scientific methods that can put a one-to-one correlation between conscious experience and neural activation, providing one answer to a very particular question of consciousness: what is the particular neural basis for particular cases of consciousness?

Neuroscience is still only in its developmental stages, not only as a store of information, but also in its approach to its study. It seems naive to cut the potential of the science so short, especially because there is simply too much at this point in time that we do not know about ourselves (i.e. our brains). As our understanding of neuroscience grows, we may work our way towards a more comprehensive picture of what consciousness is, though perhaps never directly answering the "hard question" (especially through pure objective procedure). With stronger empirical data, more conceptual and theoretical ideas (specifically aligning with evolutionary theory) could emerge to offer more reasonable explanations of consciousness and more specifically, how an experience is possible.

[|Patricia Churchland]
The basis of Chalmers' hard problem are a set of thought experiments, like the Mary problem, which suggest that facts about consciousness are more than just physical. In her paper,

//"That someone can// imagine //the possibility is not// evidence //for the real possibility. It is only evidence that somebody or other// believes //it to be a possibility. That, on its own, is not especially interesting. Imaginary evidence, needless to say, is not as interesting as real evidence, and what needs to be produced is real evidence."// (Churchland)

Churchland's argument can be stated thus:


 * 1) One can conceive that consciousness cannot be accounted for by physical facts.
 * 2) However, to have a conception about something does not demonstrate anything about the actual state of something.
 * So, one cannot demonstrate anything about the actual state of consciousness by conception of it alone.

In fact if one considers the "Mary" thought experiment in its plausibility, it has to be concluded as impossible in reality. For, because of Mary's lack of exposure to color throughout her life, she would be rendered incapable of being physically able to detect color. The occipital lobe when not used for visual processing is quickly reassigned to other perceptual and mental tasks due to plasticity (Hubel, Wiesel, 1970). Therefore poor Mary is robbed of the experience of color entirely. So although this thought experiment is effective in making the distinction of experience in our imagination, it actually holds little use. Churchland also asserts that by using such examples you, "restrict your focus to the prototypical cases" (30) and therefore oversimplify the problem being presented, without really addressing it.

= **Churchland's Conclusion** = Drawing upon historic examples. One example was found in what was once considered to be the 'easy' problem of Mercury's orbital parameters. The assumption of the day was that as more information flowed in, the problem would solve itself. Time revealed that the Einsteinian revolution was necessary to understand the planet's path. Not only was the problem "hard", it required a breakthrough in an adjascent field to reveal the results. Another example is that of heritable traits and protein folding. (The former was assumed to be //far// more enigmatic than the latter.) Interestingly enough, breakthroughs in DNA base-pairings solved the hard problem, while the so-called easy one, more than half a century later, is still unanswered. "What is the point of these stories? They reinforce the message of the argument from ignorance: from the vantage point of ignorance, it is often very difficult to tell which problem is harder, which will fall first, what problem will turn out to be more tractable than some other...When not much is known about a topic, don't take seriously someone else's heartfelt conviction about what problems are scientifically tractable. Learn the science, do the science, and see what happens." (AM34)

[|Jenann Ismael]


Descartes infamously argued that consciousness is a "substance". Frank Jackson and David Chalmers argued it is a "property," which Ismael immediately and clearly attacks, claiming that this idea of property dualism stems from a misunderstanding of the physical. Rather, **Ismael argues that consciousness is a "relation".** In the same way that a map of our location consists of three aspects: 1) my physical location, 2) a map of my physical location, and 3) a //relation// between these two parts: a "YOU ARE HERE" relation, for instance, so to is consciousness a relation.

"//...the map itself, the landscape it represents, and the relations between the two, are themselves parts of the represented landscape. Once I locate the point on the map that represents// this //place, I will find there a representation of myself, map in hand, pointing simultaneously at a part of the map and the spot beneath my feet."//

Ismael's argument can be stated as support for NCCs constituting an answer to the "hard" problem:


 * 1) An informative map represents the landscape accurately with precise details, but cannot itself describe "indexical" relations (like "here I am").
 * 2) An informative account of the brain represents the locations of activation accurately with precise details, but cannot itself describe "indexical" relations (like "that's me").
 * So, informative maps and accounts of the brain are analogous with respect to being ambiguous regarding indexical relations.
 * 1) We can discover indexical "you are here" relations on maps when we //correlate// our physical location with the maps representative location.
 * So, we can discover indexical "that's me" relations on brain accounts when we //correlate// our conscious experiences with brain activations.
 * 1) Thus, neural correlates of consciousness constitute "what it is" to be me: i.e. answers to the hard problem.

Then it could be said that consciousness in this way could be conceptualized through its relation to various brain functions like attention, memory, time perception, and decision making. The problem at the moment is that we are without a complete map to pinpoint where this consciousness is.

=Criticism of Ismael’s Map=

One issue with Ismael’s map is that no matter how fast one find their location (“I am here”), his or her mind has already moved on. When a person has found him or herself on the map of the mind, the consciousness has already changed. So the statement “I am here” should be restated as “This is where I have been”. Think of the map as a moving stream, on the stream you point to the place where you are, but by the time you point to that specific place the stream has changed, moved. You are no longer in that place, instead you have moved on with the water. The constant movement of the mind makes it difficult to place ones finger on the spot defined as “I am here”.

This points to the idea that introspection is necessarily reflective or memory-oriented. Consider the question, "What's on your mind?" Regardless of how quickly you introspect and respond, you must answer "I //was// thinking..." Not only that, but simply by thinking about what you were thinking about, your consciousness has necessarily changed and you would be communicating a necessarily incomplete answer about your own thoughts. Present reflection is thus impossible.

And even if that wasn't a real problem for her argument, the "thats me" relation found in step 5 would still have to be limited to a occurrent thought. This poses a problem for understanding consciousness on a more continual level. = = =In response to the Criticism of Ismael's Map=

Though some may argue that the mind cannot sustain the thought "I am here", two facts are evident in support of Ismael's Map: 1) the mind can focus on more than one subject at a time, and 2) the mind is able to continually focus on the same subject. Therefore the mind is able to continually focus on the thought "I am here" and communicate it. Thus it is not necessary to label all introspection as retrospection.

According to proposition (1), it is possible to properly communicate what "I am thinking" in the present tense. The mind is able to focus on "what I am currently thinking" //and// "what I am currently saying". Of course, it is often true that the mind does not focus on "what I am thinking" and "what I am saying", and instead relies on short-term memory. Nevertheless it is possible for the mind to do both.

A Christian Point of View on Ismael
Upon reading //Science and the Phenomenal// by Jenann Ismael, I was surprised to stumble upon this idea: "It is, first and foremost, a reaction against the position that Chalmers calls property dualism. For my part, it stems from the conviction that it is a misunderstanding of the nature of the //physical// to think that it could be independent of the phenomenal." (pg 51) This idea that our conscious and our bodies are connected is a fascinating idea, that perhaps what goes on inside of us and in our minds can change who we are on the outside, that how we think and how we perceive can effect who we are biologically. It makes sense, when you look to the common idea that someone who laughs a lot is generally much healthier than someone who is depressed. But as Christians we often struggle with the connection of body and soul; ever since the start of the Christian church it has been an issue, as we see in Paul's letters to the Corinthian and Thessalonian churches:

"The body is not meant for sexual immorality, but for the Lord, and the Lord for the body. And God raised the Lord and will also raise us up by His power. Do you not know that your bodies are members of Christ? Shall I then take members of Christ and make them members of a prostitute? Never! Or do you not know that he who is joined to a prostitute becomes one body with her? For, as it is written, 'The two will become one flesh.' But he who is joined to the Lord becomes one spirit with Him." (1 Cor. 6: 13-17, ESV)

Even here, Paul sees a connection between spirit (conscious) and body, and even uses them semi-interchangeably. He seems to like the idea that we treat the bodies we have with respect because they, too, will be raised up in the resurrection. Perhaps there is a built-in sense of this in everyone, for if everyone has a sense of eternity //inside// themselves (a sense that directly influences how exactly we often treat our bodies), then it is not too far a stretch to say that there is a connection between the physical and the phenomenal. Even our health is effected by our moods, how we interact and how we control our emotions day-to-day. If this is true, then isn't it logical to say that consciousness is connected to reality?

=**[|Body Soul and SPIRIT Connection] **=