Physicalism

In the Philosophy of Mind, "Physicalism" is the view that consciousness is a physical property. This is the simplest strategy to resolving (in this case eliminating) the mind/body problem, or how subjective, private mental states are caused by objective, public physical brain states. A parallel problem in Physics as to how immaterial energy packets produce material mass is resolved in a similar way by "field theory", which claims that all things are reducible to energy fields.

Theories of Materialism exist at the expense of the “manifest activity” of intelligence and behavior, i.e. self-initiated or intrinsic activity—the cause of thought or action—as opposed to being the necessary effect of some other cause. Each theory argues, in various ways, that all intelligence and behavior are the effect of some physical cause.

**Kinds of Physicalism**
__Methodological Behaviorism__ (Watson): A scientific strategy that relies only on the stimulus and response data from subjects.

__Logical Behaviorism__ (Ryle): A Philosophical view that the mind is ONLY its behavior.

E.g. Belief is “acting as if it is true”: “Jones grabs his umbrella” is what we refer to when we say that “Jones believes it is going to rain”.

__Type Identity__ (J.C.C. Smart): Mental phenomena types are identical to Physical state types of the Brain. E.g. pain is C-Fiber stimulation.

__Token Identity__ (Lewis): Mental phenomena types are identical to Physical state tokens of the Brain such that they bear the same functional relations to one another.

E.g. A belief in God’s existence is caused by the attitude that God exists and the belief in God’s existence with a desire to act as if God exists causing actions that are consistent with God’s existing.

__Strong AI__ (Johnson-Laird): The mind is the software of the brain which is the hardware.

__Eliminative Materialism__ (Churchland): Since there is no obvious translation of “mind phenomena” (folk psychology) to physical states, then there is no mind at all.

__Content__ (Putnam) Just as the content (meaning) of language requires external reference, so to does mental content require external causes. “Narrow content” is intrinsic to a word’s meaning just as roundness is intrinsic to a penny’s shape as opposed to its being in Jones’ pocket. But mental content is not narrow any more than water is intrinsically H20. E.g. Twin Oscar on Twin Earth takes water to be XYZ though he is intrinsically Oscar. So, mental content is “Broad” and not intrinsic to meaning.

**Papineau's "single effect/single cause" argument:**
1. Conscious mental occurrences have physical effects. 2. All physical effects are fully caused by purely physical prior histories. 3. The physical effects of conscious causes aren’t always overdetermined by distinct causes. 4. Thus, physicalism.

He eliminates the mind-body problem by stating that they are in fact not distinct from one another as presupposed. He claims that the materialist view "wins" because of the flaws and complications that come along with accepting dualism. Essentially the denial of his argument simply seems unreasonable to him. In his article, Papineau explores the several objections to his premises. For example, he claims that to reject premise 3 is to accept the idea of overdeterminism, which is the idea that for a single effect, there may exist two distinct but simultaneous and self-sufficient causes. However, Papineau chooses the Ockham's Razor argument to counter this objection: "Still, this then raises the question of //why// such causes should always be so counterfactually dependent, if they are ontologically distinct" (AM 129). If overdeterminism (sometimes referred to as the 'belt and braces' view) is in fact legitimate, he would argue, then materialism //should be// sufficient in itself and thus the overdeterministic argument is not necessary. He goes on to point out that we have no examples of overdeterminism occurring in nature, furthering favorable evidence for physicalism.

=**Arguments addressed by Papineau**=


 * Epiphenomenalism**: A physical state can affect a mental state, but a mental state cannot affect a physical state.

This is a denial of Premise 1 of Papineau’s Argument, which states that “Conscious mental occurrences have physical effects.” Papineau rejects this notion on the basis that it’s too complicated. He argues further that because his idea is simpler, it must be held as the better idea. This line of rebuttal, used by Papineau is also known as Ockham’s Razor.


 * Overdetermination**: There are both a physical cause and mental cause that remain separate.

This is a denial of Premise 3 of Papineau’s argument that argues: your conscious causes do not need a separate physical cause to have an effect on the physical world. Papineau denies this again by Ockham’s Razor, and also by stating that there is no place in nature where overdetermination is found.

= = =A Religious Response To Physicalism=

=
Under the theories of Physicalism, everything that exists is physical in nature. Therefore, under this theory, not only is the mind (or consciousness) physical, but also, the soul would be considered to be physical. Certainly, that theory flies in the face of basic Christian beliefs. From a Christian viewpoint, a human would consist of 2 distinct parts, a physical part (the body), and a spiritual component (the soul). The Bible says that “God formed man of the dust of the ground, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life; and man became a living soul (Genesis 2:7, KJV). Note, that man was first formed by dust (a physical element; i.e. his body). At this point, man has a body, but is not alive; he does not become alive until God breathes into him. This scripture suggests that there is no life in the physical part, the body; the life is in the soul. Therefore, if the concept of eternal life is true (as Christians believe it is), it must be the soul that lives on, not the body. Since there is no life in the physical, and the soul is eternally alive, the soul cannot be physical. Thus, from a Christian standpoint, there is no substance to the concept of physicalism. ======

Response to "A Religious Response to Physicalism":
On the contrary, if the Christian viewpoint is correct, then we see that the body, although fallen (and therefore currently mortal) it is meant for eternity, and will be resurrected to eternity. So perhaps physicalism is the Christian concept of body and soul after all! Is it too far a stretch to say that although both are one, they share distinct natures. Now of course we are not God as Christ is God, but he existed in the form of 100% man, 100% God. why can we not also be 100% body, 100% spirit? Furthering the argument, scripture //does// refer to two parts (body and spirit) yet it calls us to treat each respectfully and meaningful. Along with this, it treats the body as evil in sections referring to this distinction, although the author believes in the resurrection. I would argue that this is simply to give the Christian a division to see, between mortal, fragile things, and eternal glorious things.

** Arguments Against Physicalism **


In her article entitled "Post-physicalism," Barbara Montero suggests that "As long as one defines the physical in relation to what science tells us about the world, the problem of explaining what it means to be physical in the context of the mind-body problem ... currently has no solution" (AM 139). She claims that physicalists consistently fail to properly define what they mean by "the physical," and that when prompted for a definition, they opt for "that which can be studied scientifically," thus making //everything// physical, even when physics seems to point in the direction that some things may actually not be physical at all: "it is difficult to see what prevents //anything// from being physical: if physics (correctly) tells us that some things have no mass or no determinate spatial location, well then, physicalists will say, those things will still count as physical" (AM 138).

Her other main objective is that dualists and physicalists are focusing on the wrong question in search for an answer for the mind-body problem. The majority of philosophers addressing the issue, like Papineau define it in terms of how mentality can exist in a dominantly physical world and the relation of their distinctness or independence. Her point is that the question to be asked is, "whether mentality is a fundamental feature of the world" (AM 141). In addition to this she claims that it would be beneficial to rephrase the debate in terms of mental and non-mental, over what is physical or non-physical because of our lack of understanding of what physicality actually means. She believes these changes would prevent the word games and miscommunications that commonly occur in these debates.

=Montero's View= Barbara Montero seems to identify a crucial problem in the mind/body debate, the seemingly unbending opinions of the physicalists who defer strictly to science in trying to unravel the mystery. Montero makes a great argument against this “science or else” mentality. In answer to the question, “what does it mean to be physical?,” Montero points out that “it seems that those who take the central concern of the mind-body problem to be the relationship between mental properties and physical properties – and…this is just about everyone – should have at least a rough idea of what it means to be physical, not necessarily a strict definition, but at least a notion of the physical” (AM 137). She goes on to say, “it is not all clear, however, that physicalists can provide even this minimal condition” (AM 137). Montero hits the point exactly; how can one claim that the mind is physical when he cannot even grasp what “physical” means. Her solution to the problem of trying to determine if mentality is a “fundamental feature of the world” [AM 142], and that properties are actually mental or nonmental (as opposed to mental or physical) is at least a step in another direction. Considering the difficulty of the mind/body question, a new direction seems like a positive step.

Introduction and Dissection of Physicalism