Dualism

=Descartes Argument for Substance Dualism=
 * 1) It is conceivable (intuitively possible) that I exist & my body does not
 * 2) Whatever is conceivable is possible
 * 3) It is possible that I exist & my body does not
 * 4) I exist and my body does not
 * 5) It is possible that I ≠ my body
 * 6) I am not identical with my body (or any other extended thing)

Descartes holds this idea and Kripke decided to almost reinforce this idea through Property Dualism. He used a parallel argument that supports his view and can also be proven scientifically. =Kripke Argument for Property Dualism=
 * 1) It is conceivable (intuitively possible) that pain occurs and c does not.
 * 2) Whatever is conceivable is possible
 * 3) It is possible that pain occurs and c does not.
 * 4) Pain occurs and c does not.
 * 5) It is possible that pain ≠ c
 * 6) Pain is not identical with c

//*c = the state of having one's C-fibers fire (i.e. the neural correlate of pain)//

=Problem with Descartes and Kripke Arguments= Premise two makes an assumption that I will allow. It is a stretch to say that what is conceivable is possible. I can conceive of flying and yet I have never flown. However I allow this assumption because it is the basis of the premise. But in premise three and four, we come to the assumption that It is possible that X occurs and Y does not. In the following statement the argument makes another improbable jump, and in this case, two jumps in one argument proves to be a weak move. In premise four, X occurs and Y does not. That statement is written as if it were a law of science, but I can not allow such a jump of reasoning. This extra leap seems to be where the argument crumbles.

Certainly, Descartes’ and Kripke’s arguments have flaws. As mentioned above, there certainly seems to be a giant leap from step 3 to step 4. And, without step 4, step 6 cannot be positively accepted. However, I do not see that it is a stretch at all to progress from step 1 to step 2. Saying that something is possible is not the same thing as saying that something is real or that it cannot happen. (However, imagination may somewhat be based in reality. Descartes make this point in “Meditation I,” in Meditations on First Philosophy.” He describes a painter who is painting an imaginary picture. Descartes make the point that the painting, although imaginary, is based in reality. Thus, Descartes forms a bridge from imagination to reality). Because I have never flown does not necessarily mean that I cannot fly; it simply means that I have not yet learned how to accomplish the feat. It still may be possible. If we accept this line of thought, then moving to step 3 is not hard. Then, as suggested, if we reject step 4, step 5 then becomes the next step, a step that is quite acceptable. The last step (formerly step 6) can now say that “it is possible that pain is not identical with c” (to use Kripke’s argument as the example). And given the difficulty of the argument, it seems a positive step to demonstrate the __possibility__ of dualism.
 * Edit:**

Also one can argue that you cannot conceive of flying, you know what //flight// is but to //fly// you would require either a specific knowledge and/or appropriate physical properties. In another sense one could claim that he can fly simply because of the invention of the airplane. We conceived of man flying above ground, thus we thought of ways to get man to fly above ground.
 * Edit**:

=Dualism - W.D. Hart=

Is it possible to be disembodied? This is the fundamental question of dualism, and according to dualists such as Descartes and Hart, it is indeed possible. This is because, according to mind-body dualism, "you (or anyone else) and your body (or anyone else's) are two different substances" (AM 117).

Mind-body dualism is described thus by Hart: "Mind-body dualism is the thesis that there are at least two basic or fundamental sorts of things: one including you and other minds, selves, or persons, and the other including the bodies of you and other people as well as inanimate lumps of matter like stars, planets, and glaciers" (AM 117). Hart explains that in order to be a fundamental or basic substance, the object has to not be reliant on the existence of some other object in order to exist. Thus, because you know you can exist without dependence on some other object, you are a different substance from the people and objects around you. Furthermore, Hart asserts that your mind is a different substance, independent in its existence, from your body.

=Hart’s Argument=

Hart's argument largely derives from a Cartesian line of logic, shown below:

1. If you can imagine that P, then it is possible that P. 2. If you can imagine that you should be disembodied, then it is possible that you should be disembodied. 3. I can imagine that I am disembodied. 4. Thus, it is possible that I can be disembodied.

Hart notes rightly that the simple logic involved in the above syllogism "cannot be faulted" (in the sense that it is a valid argument in that the conclusion follows logically from the premises), and that the next step is to decide whether or not the premises are true. Premise 1 (and the second premise by association) is largely contested, and Hart defends it using historically based arguments of epistemology.

//"As a disbelief in subjective idealism should make one resist the dictum that to be is to be perceived, so an inclination toward the objectivity of nonactual possibility should make one resist the dictum that to be possible is to be imagined. Nevertheless, as perception is our favored, and perhaps only, basic epistemic access to actuality, so imagination is our favored, and perhaps only, basic epistemic access to nonactual possibility"// (AM 122).

Essentially, Hart claims that we have always taken premise 1 to be true, but perhaps have used different language to word it. He goes on to say, "When one has imagined as inventively as one is able, and it has always seemed clearly to be the case that //p// in whatever scenario one has spun out, and one has no good reason to think otherwise, then one has good reason to think it is possible that //p//." In other words, it is the best line of reasoning we have to come to a claim of truth at all, and thus should not be dismissed.

=Personal Reflection on Dualism:=

Based upon the video shown of a blind person in a disembodied experience, it seems self-evident that there is in fact a separation between mind and body, yet I cannot help but disagree with myself as well. As Christians, we know the bodies we have were not a fudge-up by God, but in fact they were created for perfection in mind, eternal and blemish-less. They were merely tainted by our own sins. We know God is a RE-NEWER not a RE-DOER. This means our bodies are meant to live forever, apart from a separate entity referred to as the soul? No, perhaps not. There may be a gap between death and the resurrection of the body, meaning a separate conscious must leave the body for some time to be in the presence of Jesus (this was demonstrated in the video shown in class concerning blind out-of-body experience). So what are we to say then concerning dualism? Perhaps the body and mind are, in fact, one! How have I come to this conclusion? Simple; is it too far a stretch to believe that our bodies contain a form, invisible to the naked eye, perhaps existing in a separate dimension (the dimension that God Himself inhabits 'physically' if you will?), that in itself is packaged the two perfect forms that we call body and mind? This would not lead to a disconnect between body and soul, because in this package they would be the same, only named as separate for the sake of comprehension. In nature and form they would be one, only the body would need two FORMS, not parts, different representations of the same thing. Perhaps dualism is the truth after all.



**Chalmers Defends Dualism:**

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=A Demonstration of Dualism:= We have heard of and read examples of people who have had out of body experiences. The accounts of these experiences often bear uncanny similarities. People report that they seem to be viewing their physical body from a vantage point of above – in other words, they are looking down on their bodies. People who relate these experiences are able to relate specific details about what was going on in the room where their body was, details that they should not be able to recount. So, if these people are seeing their body, apart from the focal point of their observation, then we can suppose that they are not seeing themselves with their body. That supposition then leads us to the idea that they must be seeing their body with another separate part, their mind. This example lends a great deal of validity to the dualism point of view.

**Dualism a general argumentative question:** Is it possible to be a christian and also be a dualist and vice versa? the other alike question to this is do all people have souls? And if not is it possible christianity is false?

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